1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
2	HOUSTON DIVISION
3	IKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION . C.A. NO. H-16-936 . HOUSTON, TEXAS
4	VS
5	PHILIPS LIGHTING NORTH AMERICA . SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 CORPORATION, et al . 2:00 P.M. to 2:26 P.M.
6	
7	TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KEITH P. ELLISON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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10	APPEARANCES:
11 12	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. WILLIAM G. SHAW, JR.
13	Attorney at Law 1117 Grassmere Richardson, Texas 75080
14	
15	FOR THE DEFENDANTS: * MR. JEREMY P. OCZEK Bond Schoeneck King PLLC
16	200 Delaware Ave Suite 900
17	Buffalo, NY 14202
18	
19	ALSO PRESENT: * MR. JOHN PINT
20	
21	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: MS. KATHY L. METZGER U.S. Courthouse
22	515 Rusk Room 8004
23	Houston, Texas 77002 713-250-5208
24	* Appearing by phone
25	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

Jeremy Oczek

## PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon and welcome. 3 MR. SHAW: Good afternoon, Judge. 4 MR. OCZEK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: We're on the record now in Ikan versus Philips. And we'll take appearances of counsel, beginning here 6 7 in the courtroom. MR. SHAW: Good afternoon, Judge. My name is William 8 Shaw, S-h-a-w, on behalf of Ikan. 9 10 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. OCZEK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 11 12 with Bond, Schoeneck and King on the phone, representing defendant Philips Lighting North America Corporation. 13 14 also, Your Honor, as with the initial status conference a 15 couple weeks ago, I have on the line, with your permission, a representative of Philips Lighting, Mr. John Pint. Mr. Pint is 16 with Philips Lighting Intellectual Property, which is part of 17

Philips Lighting North America Corporation.

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THE COURT: Okay. All of you are welcome and we are glad to have you.

I know something about the history of this case and the fact that it has a companion case in Massachusetts. Ιt seems to me that it would be good for me to decide the personal jurisdiction question before the Massachusetts -- District of Massachusetts Court gets into the motions pending before it.

As I understand it, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Philips has to do with their licensing -- not "their." It has to do with its licensing activities directed to residents of the state and further based on assertions of patent infringement directed to residents of the state of Texas. Is that fair, Mr. Shaw?

MR. SHAW: That is fair in part, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAW: In addition to that, for specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff has alleged that on March 31st of this year, Philips' general counsel, Mr. Pint, sent an e-mail to me, me on behalf of Ikan, in which he made threats that he was going to contact the administration for a national trade show in Las Vegas, the National Association of Broadcasters, which is a large and substantial trade show. It's the largest in the country. And it would have interfered deeply with Ikan's business activities at the trade show.

THE COURT: That's the nature of another cease and desist letter, right? It says, "Stop what you're doing or else"?

MR. SHAW: It was a stop what you're doing and sign license agreements or we are going to reserve the right -- they didn't make an overt threat that I'm going to go talk to the NAB administrators, but it was a clearly implied threat, that Philips was going to interfere with Ikan's business at the

trade show.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAW: So -- if I may finish, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

MR. SHAW: Those are the facts that support that allegation of personal jurisdiction.

The arguments in the motion to transfer and the motion to dismiss go further than that, because Philips argues that the e-mails and the communications between the two parties constituted nothing more than cease and desist letters, offers of settlement, offers of licensing and hybrids. The argument of Ikan, as the plaintiff, goes one step further and says, true, all those were elements of the communications between the parties, but Philips went that one step further, making the threat of interfering with business. They didn't make that as -- that's not an offer of settlement. That's not an offer of licensing. That's a threat, that we're going to go that extra step if you don't sign the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you finished?

MR. SHAW: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Oczek.

MR. OCZEK: Your Honor, if I may, I think you're exactly right to suggest that the issue of personal jurisdiction is a threshold issue and can be decided and should be decided before we argue next week. There's an oral argument

on the motion to transfer in Boston next week. And the record's now closed, and the only allegation by Ikan is that there is allegedly specific jurisdiction. There's no allegation of general jurisdiction, no argument whatsoever about general jurisdiction. And the only argument is the And the specific is, is the evidence on the record before this Court consists of both parties conceding there were three years of on-and-off discussions. In terms of the record, there's only three correspondence from Philips to Ikan. this is attached to Ikan's complaint. They attached a letter from February 20, 2013; an e-mail from March 2013; and then an e-mail from March 31st, 2016, which is the e-mail that Mr. Shaw just referred to. And that's the only argument -- or only evidence in the record.

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And, Your Honor, first of all, this is -- the Federal Circuit law applies here for personal jurisdiction, even though personal jurisdiction is in all cases. Given that there are patent issues at play, the Federal Circuit has said even when it's a declaratory judgment action, that the Federal Circuit law applies. And what we have, Your Honor, is two seminal cases on this very issue before the Court is, does a cease and desist letter or even threats of infringement rise to the level of specific jurisdiction. Fifth Circuit --

THE COURT: Okay. You're referring to Red Wing Shoe and Beverly Hills --

1 MR. OCZEK: Red Wing Shoe, Your Honor, and the Avocent 2 case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OCZEK: Those two, I think, clearly say that cease and desist letters, license negotiations, threats of -- or accusations of infringement clearly don't confer personal jurisdiction. And Ikan, by the way, doesn't come forward with any other case otherwise. It only cites to Red Wing in its argument.

And the other thing that's important here, Your

Honor -- and *Avocent* talks about this pretty nicely. It talks
about the different -- the distinction and the personal
jurisdiction of analysis between what I'll call a garden
variety patent infringement suit, which is a typical suit --

THE COURT: I've got to slow you down a little bit, Mr. Oczek. You're going too fast for me and for the court reporter.

MR. OCZEK: Sure. I apologize, Your Honor. Thank you.

So, with respect to *Avocent* -- that's a Federal Circuit case, which is set in our brief. It's 552 F.3d 1324. But *Avocent* has a nice discussion on the distinction and personal jurisdiction analysis between what I'll call a garden variety patent case, which is where the patentee is asserting infringement, and on the other hand, which is what we have

here, a declaratory judgment action involving allegations of noninfringement and invalidity. And to that end, *Avocent* says -- and this is on 1486 of *Avocent* -- "But in the context of an action for declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity and/or unenforceability, the patentee is the defendant, and the claim asserted by the plaintiff relates to the, quote, 'wrongful restraint by the patentee on the free exploitation of noninfringing goods, such as the threat of an infringement suit.' Thus, the nature of the claim" --

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THE COURT: Okay. Take a breath. Take a breath. Slow.

"Thus the nature of the claim in a MR. OCZEK: Sure. declaratory judgment action is, quote, 'to clear the air of infringement charges, 'end quote. Such a claim neither directly arises out of nor relates to the making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing of arguably infringing products in the forum, but instead arises out of or relates to the activity of the defendant patentee in enforcing the patent or patents-in-suit. The relevant inquiry for specific personal jurisdiction purposes then becomes to what extent has the defendant patentee, quote, 'purposefully directed such enforcement activities at residents of the forum, ' end quote, and the extent to which the declaratory judgment claim, end quote -- or, quote, 'arises out of or relates to those activities, '" end quote.

But I think that's important to state, Your Honor. Because, again, all we have here is the allegations of infringement that are the basis of specific jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit cases that we cited are clear, that even on the facts that Mr. Shaw cites, even assuming those facts are true, that doesn't rise, that doesn't confer specific jurisdiction. And as a matter of law, this case must be dismissed as to Philips Lighting.

And there's also an instructive recent case from a sister court in the Western District of Texas, decided in March 2016 of this year, and that's the *Broadway Bank* case, which pursuant to Your Honor's procedures for citing unpublished decisions, that's attached as Docket 17-5 to our reply. But just like here, there were allegations of patent infringement. On the basis of those allegations, the declaratory judgment, plaintiff filed an action, and on very similar facts to what we have here, the Western District dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. OCZEK: So, Your Honor, we submit on the record before this Court and as a matter of the clear Federal Circuit law on this very issue, as a threshold issue, personal jurisdiction -- there's no personal jurisdiction over Philips Lighting, and the Court can decide this whole motion on this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

Okay. Mr. Shaw.

MR. SHAW: Your Honor, the various cases that Philips cites all have a limited set of circumstances and the limited circumstances are that the communications between the parties constituted mere cease and desist letters, mere demands for licensing agreements. It doesn't go that next step, which Philips went in this case, of adding in threats of interfering with the business activities of the alleged infringing party. The extra step that Philips went in sending the e-mail of March 31st of this year takes this case beyond the realm of cases like Red Wing and the Avocent case and the various other cases cited, such as Companion and the National Bank versus Plano case.

I would like to recite briefly from *Red Wing*, since Your Honor pointed to that and Mr. Oczek did as well.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAW: This is Red Wing Shoe Company versus

Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. And it is 148 F.3d, 1355. And I'm

reciting from pages 1360, 1361.

"Even though cease and desist letters alone are often substantially related to the cause of action, thus providing minimum contacts, the minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and substantial justice defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction. Principles of fair play and

substantial justice afford a patentee sufficient latitude to inform others of its patent rights without subjecting it to jurisdiction in a foreign forum. A patentee should not subject its -- excuse me. A patentee should not subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement.

Grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with the principles of fairness."

That's what the Red Wing court says. The facts

That's what the *Red Wing* court says. The facts in this case go beyond that.

THE COURT: What's your best authority for the proposition that that next step makes Philips subject to jurisdiction?

MR. SHAW: I don't have a specific case to recite to you at this moment. It's the concept that Philips directed its actions from its office in Boston, Massachusetts, to the office of Ikan in Houston, Texas, sending a threat, that it was going to interfere with its business relationships. The cases that are cited by defendant, Philips, do not --

THE COURT: They don't cover that fact?

MR. SHAW: They do not rise to that. Therefore, I step back to the general concept of first to file -- I'm sorry. You're asking about jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHAW: Personal jurisdiction is established by the

actions that Philips directed at Ikan -- excuse me -- in Houston.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Oczek.

MR. OCZEK: Your Honor, I think that this is a novel and new argument by Mr. Shaw, which is certainly not set forth in his opposition, and as he concedes, he has no support for it. That being said, I think if you read -- I think the -- I think the Red Wing case, the Avocent case, and the cases we cited from the sister Texas courts on this very issue completely support our position.

And I should also add, there are no allegations of any sort of interference with business contacts in this case. There's no claim. The only claims in the original declaratory judgment complaint filed in April and in the claims in the amended complaint in August are simply to alleged noninfringement and alleged invalidity. That's it, nothing else. So, to the extent Mr. Shaw argues otherwise, that's certainly not in the case.

THE COURT: So, you're saying that the threats of disrupting the Las Vegas show were not part of the complaint?

MR. OCZEK: Well, first of all, I wouldn't say they were threats to disrupt the Las Vegas show. That's certainly Mr. Shaw's spin. I think an objective read of that e-mail in context --

THE COURT: Well, I mean, but for now, the

nonmovant's --1 2 MR. OCZEK: Yes. THE COURT: -- the nonmovant's allegations have to be 3 accepted. But you're saying that allegation doesn't appear in 4 5 the complaint; is that correct? 6 MR. OCZEK: That's correct, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. I want to consult with my 8 colleagues just a moment. Please don't go away. 9 MR. OCZEK: Okay. (Brief break.) 10 THE COURT: Okay. I'm back. Anything more from 11 12 anyone? MR. SHAW: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. 13 14 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 15 MR. SHAW: Your Honor asked me what was my authority for specific jurisdiction. 16 17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. SHAW: And let me say it this way: The authority 18 19 for specific jurisdiction arises from the declaratory judgment statute itself. The question is whether this became a 20 justiciable controversy at the time that the March 31st e-mail 21 was sent to Ikan. Did that create a justiciable controversy 22 23 between the parties that was more than just -- that arose from more than just letters of cease and desist and letters of 24 25 offer. By sending that e-mail that constituted a threat to

interfere with business relations at the trade show, Philips created a justiciable controversy that was then ripe to be brought to the Court.

THE COURT: Well, don't cease and desist letters by their nature carry with it -- carry with them some threat of action? I mean, that's built into a cease and desist letter, isn't it?

MR. SHAW: I accept that premise. Yes, it does. That's the whole purpose of a cease and desist letter, either quit or something bad is going to happen, such as we're going to file suit, but not something bad will happen such as we're going to go to the National Association of Broadcasters and tell them that you are infringing and thereby get you kicked out of the trade show or otherwise interfere with your business at the trade show. That was the step -- that was the one step further than just bringing an action in court.

THE COURT: Well, this is catching me totally unaware. I wasn't -- I saw the reference to the threats and that was invoked to explain why Ikan had to file a lawsuit here. And --

MR. OCZEK: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: -- I didn't know that it was going to be used as a basis for personal jurisdiction.

Yes, Mr. Oczek.

MR. OCZEK: Your Honor, Mr. Shaw, with all due respect, is confusing the issues between Article III

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jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, which are distinct
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    issues. Personal jurisdiction obviously is whether there's
    specific or general jurisdiction over the defendant. What he
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    seems to be arguing by the cease and desist letter, is that
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    there was -- that it demonstrated that there was a case or
    controversy between the parties such as to confer Article III
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    jurisdiction. We don't contest that there's Article III --
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    that there's a case in controversy, an Article III
    jurisdiction, but that's completely separate and a distinct
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    issue from personal jurisdiction.
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             THE COURT: No, I think I understand the distinction.
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             MR. OCZEK: Yes.
             THE COURT: But --
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             MR. OCZEK: That's the issue we raised under 12(b)(2).
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             THE COURT: -- I'm just caught unaware on this,
    because I didn't think of this as a basis on which to rest
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   personal jurisdiction. And I haven't even looked at the letter
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    or whatever. Is it in the form of an e-mail or telephone
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    conversation or what?
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                        This was in the form of an e-mail on
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             MR. SHAW:
    March 31st from Mr. Pint to me. If the Court would like, I
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    have a copy of --
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             THE COURT: Hand it to Mr. Rivera, if you would.
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             MR. SHAW: Mr. Oczek, what I've handed to the clerk is
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    an unmarked copy of the e-mail that John Pint sent me on
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March 31st of 2016. 1 2 MR. OCZEK: Is this a docket copy? MR. SHAW: No, this does not happen to be a docket 3 It's a complete copy from my e-mail system. 4 5 THE COURT: It says it's from John Pint, P-i-n-t. It's to William Shaw. It begins, "Hi, Bill." Are you familiar 6 with that Mr. Oczek? 8 MR. SHAW: If I may, Your Honor. The paper that I handed you, the first page of the paper I handed you is 9 identical to what is attached to both the amended complaint and 10 the complaint. The following pages are not part of the 11 12 complaint. MR. OCZEK: Your Honor, what I have in front of me is 13 14 Docket 11-9, which is one of the exhibits to the amended 15 complaint, and that is the March 31st e-mail. The second paragraph is, "I see 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 that Ikan will be attending the NAB show in a few weeks." Do you see that? 18 19 MR. SHAW: That is part of the exhibit that Mr. Oczek just cited to you, Judge. 20 21 THE COURT: I just want to make sure Mr. Oczek is where I am. 22 23 MR. OCZEK: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: You have the letter in front of you, right? 25

MR. OCZEK: I do. 1 2 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that this is much beyond a cease and desist letter, just Philips reserves all 3 rights, including its right to bring the issue to NAB's 4 5 I'm not sure that's much of a threat, any different from cease and desist. 6 7 The last sentence of that paragraph is, "I'm 8 sorry that it has come to this, but Ikan cannot simply continue to infringe while other companies, including several that will 9 be at the show" -- omission -- "are respecting Philips' 10 rights." 11 12 I'm afraid this is not a separate and independent basis for personal jurisdiction. I can see why it was a matter 13 14 of some concern to Ikan, but I'm afraid I'm going to have to 15 grant the motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds. I'm very sorry. These are always hard cases. Thank you very 16 17 much. Thank you, Judge. 18 MR. SHAW: 19 MR. OCZEK: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Thank you, Judge. Appreciate your time. 21 MR. SHAW:

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(Concluded at 2:26 p.m.)

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause, to the best

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3	/s/ <u>Xathy L. Metager</u> 12-16-2016  Kathy L. Metzger Date Official Court Reporter
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